Category: Tactics

Future Tank Capabilities

On June 6, 2019

In the previous post, I took at look at whether tanks will continue to exist for the foreseeable future (yes) despite improvements in weaponry. In this post I’ll take a look at what sort of capabilities I think such a vehicle will have — onboard UAS, defilade engagement munitions, and closing the standoff gap with ATGMs. I’m not sure whether active protection systems will eliminate the need for heavy armor, but I lean towards “no”. These increased capabilities will make four-man crews ideal even with an autoloaded main gun.

Note on Autonomy

The ability to operate in a degraded or contested EW/low-altitude air environment will probably be a defining characteristic of a future tank, because in a completely permissive environment it will always be safer and more cost effective to fire a networked standoff munition. So while a future tank will be integrated into battlefield networks just as they are today, it should never rely on this to kill the enemy or deny terrain. In this way it is the inverse of an artillery piece which attacks from standoff under direction from a third party but has a non-central direct fire capability.

In a completely permissive environment, a battle tank will also be a less cost-effective sensor than something stripped of a tank’s protection and firepower.

Protection

The biggest question about protection of the future tank is whether it should dump its ultra-heavy armor. This could happen because new munitions make armor useless, because of the availability of more effective alternatives to heavy armor, or some combination.

img[1]

M1A2C / SEPv3. Visible: Standard side-skirt ERA, more turret front armor, Trophy APS.

I assume that APS is the replacement for heavy armor. Even if some breakthrough in materials science occurs that allows a drastic increase in the protection:weight ratio of armor, which I don’t think likely, there is the perennial problem of lightweight equipment: when the weight of something decreases, you usually just carry more of it.

Reliable APS being a relatively new technology, no one appears ready to strip the armor off their tanks in favor of it. Even an ideal APS will require much more attention from the crew than armor does now and will sometimes not be working. Will future commanders allow their tanks to go into battle with an inoperable APS? If tank armor continues to provide the level of protection against likely threats that it does today (pretty good), then probably yes. If a vehicle is in little better shape than a jeep without its APS system, then probably not.

If antiarmor munitions continue to improve and proliferate, this decision could eventually become pointless, but I don’t think that we will get there. The HEAT warhead has probably reached its maximum penetration-to-size ratio, so further improvements will probably be in guidance and, eventually, counter-countermeasures. Regarding the latter, as APS systems improve, more of a munition’s payload will be dedicated to counteracting active defenses, which could actually make armor more effective in combination with active defense. The current situation of a protection spectrum with battle tanks at the top will then continue.

Another consideration for protection is the increasing importance of urban warfare. Urban environments and restrictive terrain in general counterintuitively favor a very heavily armored tank because the canalization and restricted fields of fire inherent to such environments imply that a tank will ceteris paribus be less able to survive through maneuver or standoff firepower. Antiarmor attacks there will occur at shorter ranges (including “zero-range” emplaced explosives, and implying a greater angular range) and will be harder to simply avoid. Because urban warfare will only become more common in the future, there will still be a use for heavily armored tanks, and nations that prefer a more-or-less one-size-fits-all approach to tanks will continue to use heavily armored tanks.

My guess would be that a lightly-armored, APS-protected tank could be useful for a mechanized force oriented towards maneuver warfare, but less so for urban combat for the reasons stated above — anyone who decided to build an APS-protected medium tank would still probably keep a few of their older, heavily armored vehicles as infantry-supporting urban combat specialists.

Another aspect of protection that I want to mention is CBRN defense. Armored vehicles with CBRN overpressure systems are just better (can operate for longer with fewer casualties) in a contaminated environment than light infantry wearing protective suits. Also, ultradense tank armor provides excellent protection against radiation.

Armament

The tank’s basic suite of weapons: a cannon, a coaxial machine gun, and a heavy machine gun — won’t see a serious change. The only major disruption I can see is the installation of an autocannon basically designed to saturate or otherwise disable an enemy’s APS system (a heavy machine gun doesn’t have the range and might not have the power for this). I don’t think this will happen — more likely a single antiarmor round will carry counter-countermeasures with the goal of maintaining one hit/one kill — but I think it is possible.

A larger gun is unlikely because of the resulting decrease in ammunition load. The decreasing ammo load of tanks with increasing gun size has not been too serious a problem because it has been accompanied by greater accuracy and greater lethality — an Abrams may only carry half as many rounds as a Sherman, but more of those rounds hit their target and more of those targets are destroyed. A 140mm or larger gun will only be adopted if new protection schemes prove insurmountable by advanced 120mm ammunition, which I doubt. For instance, while installation of an ammunition data link on the M1A2C is nominally to allow use of a programmable airburst round, it could also work with a selectable top-attack munition, maybe based on the canceled XM943 STAFF.

The future tank will be able to match the range of, at least, any ground-launched line-of-sight ATGM. Entire battalions are wiped out at NTC at standoff by tank destroyers armed with simulated Konkurs and Kornet missiles, and the performance has been repeated several times in combat albeit not against Americans.

48BD1B4600000578-5332247-image-a-42_1517403165742[1] This can happen to you.

This is obviously absurd, unacceptable, and unnecessary. Extended-range guided shells will be available for every tank in the future. For 120mm guns, the LAHAT/Nimrod is already available, although it’s probably worth developing a high pressure/high velocity missile.

In addition to increased range, the future tank will have some non line-of-sight (NLOS) or “anti-defilade” capability. The guided munition mentioned above will have the capability to be directed onto a target by a third platform. This could be a separately deployed sensor but in keeping with the importance of autonomy mentioned above will include an onboard small UAS with a short-range, high-bandwidth data link.

While the UAS’s video output will need to be visible to the vehicle commander, its actual operation will be the responsibility of the fourth crew member (“loader”). Task load on the other three members of the crew is already too high. Three-man crews will be only be found on limited-purpose support vehicles like the Stryker MGS. Yes, this means that Eastern tanks with three-man crews are headed down the wrong path. Most likely, operators of T-72s and derivative designs will make ineffective attempts to reduce crew load by automation or introduce a second platform, increasing vulnerability to EM disruption.

Other Considerations

All of these new capabilities will require yet more electrical power. This is a well-known fact, just about every upgrade to every armored vehicle currently in service includes increases in onboard electrical generation, but I wanted to point it out anyway.

Aside from the integrated small UAS mentioned above, non-targeting “situational awareness” cameras will be common with the goal of making the vehicle “transparent” as with the F-35’s helmet display, and minimizing the need to fight with hatches open. My experience with experimental cameras of this sort makes me doubt this goal will ever be completely realized — mud and other terrain hazards will frequently obscure the sensors, which will probably have rather small apertures. Still, it will continue the long trend of improved awareness inside armored vehicles.

Electronic warfare equipment will become more common if not standard, although this may be considered an extension of a vehicle’s active protection system. Disrupting an adversary’s tactical datalinks in order to avoid succumbing to the logic of “sensors and dispensers” will become so important that even the most trivial employment of combat power won’t be done without it. And based on the logic of autonomy as a defining characteristic of a future tank, they will probably need an onboard EW suite including a more powerful jammer than the very short range counter-IED systems that have been deployed in recent wars, rather than completely relying on separate platforms. Tankers already need to reacquaint themselves with passive measures like EM signature reduction anyway, so management of a 3kW jammer wouldn’t be out of the question. I don’t think that a tank chassis will be used as a dedicated EW platform since such a vehicle wouldn’t need the same level of protection as a tank.

Crew training standards will increase, and may approach those of flight crew although I don’t think they will ever actually reach that level — flight is inherently less fault tolerant than ground movement. Standardized schools and qualifications not just for initial entry but for each crew position might become a reality. Unit leaders now can get ahead of the curve by instituting stricter crew qualification standards on their own initiative.

Notes on Jomini

By sfoil

On April 22, 2019

In Military History, Military Theory, Tactics

Having read Clausewitz, the natural thing to do is to read Antoine-Henri Jomini. So what does he say?

200px-Gleyre_Antoine_Henri_Jomini[1]

I read the 1862 translation of The Art of War (1838), which includes some later-written appendices and afterthoughts.

On the whole, Jomini concerns himself with the practical side of military operations, even delving down to the lowest tactical level. He considers politics (and morality) only loosely connected to the question with which he concerns himself: how best to move, sustain, and employ military forces most effectively. Despite his reputation as a highly prescriptive theorist, he is too wise to claim that following his dicta will guarantee victory even in favorable circumstances, although he writes in a very forthright and confident manner when expressing his ideas.

Jomini has two basic principles: identify and concentrate on a “decisive point”, and ensure that one’s line of communications be kept open to the “base” from which the army issues. His major corollary: the use of interior lines allows an army to outperform its opponent in accomplishing these tasks.

Small UAS & Supply Constraints

By sfoil

On September 22, 2018

In Current Affairs, Military Theory, Robots, Tactics

Just as firearms require ammunition and vehicles require fuel, small unmanned systems (SUAS, even if the “A” does stand for “air”) require electrical power. This allows us to make some predictions about the capabilities and tactics of small units with SUAS.

Tradeoffs & Alertness

SUAS and their power supplies have weight and volume. Since the capacity of any transport (including soldiers’ own two feet) is limited, either future SUAS will take up currently “extra” capacity, or they will replace something currently carried.

Soldiers can eat their boots, but tanks need gas.

General George S. Patton

Like fuel and ammunition, unit leaders must recognize SUAS operating time as a finite commodity to be expended for tactical effect. A unit equipped with multiple SUAS platforms will not have them all on at the same time for the same reason they don’t keep their soldiers awake, run vehicles, or fire machine guns 24 hours a day. Generally, a unit’s SUAS will either be “inert”, “alert”, or “engaged” — offline while the unit is either not threatened or covered by another unit, minimally operating to maintain awareness and detect threats, or at maximum capacity to neutralize a threat. This is exactly analogous to existing tactics and not difficult to understand.

The default “alert” SUAS will most likely be a fixed-wing flier, since these provide the most efficient power to operating time ratio. Ground vehicles (SUGS?) could have an even higher ratio since they wouldn’t need motor power when not moving, and might be an option for static units or to absolutely minimize aerial/EM footprints. However, they’ll be slower and easier to hide from. Note that the RQ-11 Raven is probably too large for a true light infantry platoon and certainly too large for a squad.

Get used to this thing.

Limitations

The tradeoff problem is most pronounced for light infantry. In general, these men carry as much as they can and not a pound less. Any “excess” load capacity ends up filled by extra ammunition. How much and what sort of ammunition a light infantry company, platoon, or squad ought to give up in favor of SUAS is an empirical question, but I highly doubt the answer is zero. Most likely, the lightest units will mostly use SUAS for detection and rely on external assets to kill, as they do now with artillery. Since the detection capability of SUAS-equipped units will increase, the ratio of infantry to “artillery” will likewise increase.

dismount_ew

The future is so bright for carrying heavy shit, you don’t need eyes to see it.

Armored units also have a problem. First, the effective movement and weapon ranges of armored fighting vehicles are higher than light infantry, so their “small” unmanned systems will generally be larger. A SUAS with a 5-km range is of limited use to a tank that can already see and shoot nearly that far, and is more likely located in unrestrictive terrain.

The more critical problem is that of crew load. Fighting a tank requires all of the crew’s attention; they don’t have any to spare for SUAS. While automation and control might allow this in the future, the problem is nontrivial. These two issues have frustrated attempts to integrate SUAS into mechanized and especially tank formations so far. In the short term, any integration of unmanned systems into armored units will probably require the use of a separate, dedicated control vehicle. In the long term, designers will have to start paying as much attention to crew load and systems integration inside fighting vehicles as in aircraft.

Motor-rifle type units (such as “Stryker” brigades) are best suited to take advantage of SUAS. They have ready access to electrical power and transport. Designers clearly anticipated something like this requirement in developing modern troop carriers, which can readily serve as mobile control stations.

Tactical Electronic Warfare

EM emissions discipline will become both more important and more complex. The likelihood of initial enemy contact being made on either or both side via identification of SUAS will be high. Small-unit commanders and soldiers should know the significance of enemy small unmanned platforms just as they now know the significance of other types of enemy equipment.

antenna_truck

A stopgap solution, gluing lots of antennas to a completely roadbound vehicle.

Mature SUAS will be well camouflaged and probably most easily identified through detecting their control and communication links. The ability to detect EM emissions across a broad spectrum will become as important even at the platoon if not the squad level as image intensifiers and near-infrared are now. Tactical electronic warfare units that specialize in detecting, spoofing, and obstructing these emissions beyond the capability of line combat units will return. The resulting arms race between tactical unmanned systems and electronic warfare will contribute to the unsuitability of amateur/civilian UAVs in combat.

Conclusion

Motorized infantry stand to gain the most from small unmanned systems because of their manpower and transport capability. Light infantry have limited payload, and current armored units are too specialized.

Officers should get used to viewing SUAS operating time as a supply constraint, and establish standard readiness postures for stand-down, baseline, and stand-to use of these devices.

Electronic warfare will become more important at all tactical levels.

How Small Drones Will Be Different

By sfoil

On September 14, 2018

In Military Theory, Robots, Tactics

A remote-operated aircraft flown into a target while the operator watches not only isn’t something new, but it’s already been done in volume and found wanting. An apparent attempt to assassinate the President of Venezuela by such means last month didn’t work.

venezuelan_assassination

Some guy scraped up after an attempted murder-by-drone.

A drone that can fly at 200mph for three kilometers, operated over an ECM-hardened control link, and delivering a 5+ lb armor-piercing explosive warhead has existed for ovr fifty years now. The AT-3 Sagger came, made its impact, and we all moved on. Visually flying your remote-controlled aircraft into a target is called Manual Command Line of Sight, and it’s not used for anything important (more discussion here). Small autonomous systems will change the battlefield, but flying a much smaller payload onto a target over a less secure control channel than primitive missiles is not going to be how it happens. Hit probability and kill probability are low, with high vulnerability to electronic countermeasures. Taping a grenade to your kid’s toy helicopter won’t going to give you the edge you need to win on tomorrow’s battlefield. The characteristics of such a line-of-sight weapon compare poorly to the currently dominant line of sight personal weapon, the rifle.

Anyway, what will change? The important factors are availability & control.

The ATGM Threat Part 3: Solutions

By sfoil

On August 9, 2018

In Current Affairs, Military Theory, Tactics

I’ve previously posted about the history of antiarmor weapons and the current state-of-the-art. The takeaway: tanks have never been invulnerable, and they don’t need to be. Also, Anti-Tank Guided Missiles have become and are becoming longer-ranged, more accurate, and more lethal. Despite improvements in ATGM technology over first-generation weapons like the AT-3 Sagger, American tactics have remained essentially unchanged for decades, although armor protection has improved.

The ATGM threat profile is a combination of standoff and high kill probability (per launch). Remember, these don’t have to make ATGMs completely worthless, just make them less useful. I’ll look at standoff first.

The ATGM Threat Pt 1: A Brief History of Anti-Armor Weapons

By sfoil

On August 2, 2018

In Military History, Tactics

Right now, I think that anti-armor weapons have gained an upper hand over tanks and other armored vehicles, and that the United States is falling behind in anti-anti-armor measures. They can take several courses to correct this. First, however, I want to lay out the history of the threat and how the current situation developed.

The First Tanks

Although it wasn’t the first battle in which tanks took part, the Battle of Cambrai in 1917 is the first major combined arms attack with a significant armored component, the use of armored vehicles beforehand having been relatively piecemeal. Together with the infantry of the 51st Highland Division, 476 British armored vehicles took part, of which 350 were combat vehicles (the rest were supply carriers and mobile radio stations, with perhaps some engineers in the mix). The attack succeeded, although as usual in the First World War the attackers proved unable to exploit their gains over the following days.