In a previous post, I talked about what parts of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War I thought had little relevance today. Let’s look at what has endured. Once again, I’ll start with the most difficult concepts and save the more trivial or obvious observations until the end.
The Synthetic Nature of War
“War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes.”
Book 1 Ch 1
“Were [war] a complete, untrammeled, absolute manifestation of violence…[it] would of its own independent will usurp the place of [politics] the moment policy had brought it into being […] But in reality things are different…in reality war, as has been shown, is not like that.”
Book 1 Ch 1
“War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” Note of 10 July 1827
Clausewitz noted and described a natural tendency of wars and warfare to escalate in violence outside the control of the combatants. This tendency existed both in specific conflicts, and across longer periods of time; in his otherwise rather irrelevant chapter on the billeting of troops in Book 7 Chapter 19, he notes the increasing insecurity of what we might today call forward base areas both during his own life and compared to the historical past of the 16th and 17th centuries, an expansion of violence in time and space. This expansion predated the dominating military “technology” of Clausewitz’s day, the social technology of levee en masse or general conscription.
(Clausewitz thinks pre-gunpowder warfare generally irrelevant to military theory, but I will note that the armies of Classical Antiquity often took great care in securing their camps – most famously, the Romans – so this is not an unbroken trend.)
Clausewitz calls the “logical” outcome of this escalating tendency – a war in which the total material and moral resources of a nation are committed without reserve into a single decisive act to completely disarm the enemy or be disarmed – “absolute war”. Again, Clausewitz uses the logic but not the wording of opportunity cost to justify and qualify the “single decisive act” which may in fact be extended in space and time: “if all had been committed in the first act there could really be no question of a second” (Book 1 Ch 1). I read this simply as an assumption of maximum efficiency.
This doesn’t happen – anyone can look around and see – so countervailing pressures must exist outside the logic of escalation, an antithesis from which the synthesis, war as it occurs, arises. These restraints take two forms: physical and political.
(The use of Fichte’s terminology of synthesis is my own, not Clausewitz’s, although the two were contemporaries in the same general milieu and I do not think the similarities are coincidental. The great German philosophers must have influenced Clausewitz’s thinking, even if indirectly.)
Political restraints follow from Clausewitz’s maxim about war being a continuation of politics. His maxim is a description of how things are, not an ideal of how things ought to be. Wars have a political purpose, and even highly militaristic political regimes have purposes other than warfare. So, not all resources end up allocated towards war or a given war, to include “moral” or psychological resources. A nation might wage a mean little war to seize a disputed scrap of territory; materially it won’t spend much money (or even send its best men) given the low stakes. And those men, knowing the low stakes, probably won’t be particularly motivated; they may even be inclined to run or shirk. Note here an opening for social technologies that enable objectively low-stakes wars to be fought zealously. Clausewitz (as did Machiavelli, his likely source here) uses the condottiere warfare of Italy in the late Middle Ages as an example of such a situation and, albeit somewhat implicitly, also to demonstrate systematic improvements in the motivation (“moral factors”) of European armies.
Treaties, agreements, and custom also fall into the political category. In modern terms, we see more or less extensively honored treaties and taboos against the use of certain weapons and tactics, such as nuclear explosives, land mines, or internment. Remember, these restraining factors only act against the totalizing/escalating factors of “absolute war”, they don’t totally dominate; what’s important is that they can and do act dialectically against the logic of escalation to produce the synthesis of War as it Actually Happens.
The other category of restraining factors is physical. As Clausewitz noted, “friction” makes all tasks more difficult than they are in theory. Such friction inheres in all things, but war greatly increases them by introducing the malevolent actions of the enemy. Even more mundane physical considerations prevail. Troops can only mobilize and move into position so quickly, the judgment of commanders is only so sound, fire can only spread so rapidly, men starve so slowly, the cannon only fire every so often and do so much damage, etc. Military technology has largely been the history of removing these restraints – and as a result the political factors mentioned above are now more important relative to the physical difficulty of destruction as a limiting factor than in Clausewitz’s era – but they still exist. Even the most apocalyptic modern weapons have finite capabilities.
The synthesis does not produce the same result always and everywhere because of differing component characteristics. Some wars approach the Absolute; others more closely approach a snowball fight. Still the restraint vs escalation schema describes what we see remarkably well and even allows making predictions. The framework easily accommodates epochal changes in both technology and political systems.
The Fundamentals of Strategy
“War can be of two kinds…either the objective is to overthrow the enemy—to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent…or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations. […] The aims of the two types are quite different…”
Note of 10 July 1827
“Theory Thus Studies the Nature of Ends and Means”
Book 2 Ch 2
On War comes very close to Arthur Lykke’s model of strategy as “ways, means, and ends” (means = resources, ways = actions taken with those resources towards a desired end), seen in the above quotations. Clausewitz does not make this so explicit as Lykke, but he is thinking along the same general lines that strategy is “how to get what you want with what you’ve got”.
Clausewitz identifies the overriding necessity of determining the ends – the objective – clearly from the outset in stridently emphatic terms:
“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking”
Book 1 Ch 1.
He adds the caveat that tactical victories must be exploited to maximize their strategic effect, that this exploitation is a difficult task requiring skill and determination, and that even in ideal circumstances the such effects have limitations and diminishing returns. Conversely, defeats can be mitigated and aren’t of unlimited consequence (at least from a certain detached perspective, I would add).
“In War the Result is Never Final”
Book 1 Ch 1
“There will always be time enough to die”
Book 6 Ch 26
“[Strategy has] no historical beginning in any way accessible to us, and most likely it will have no end in the future”
Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy
On War portrays – correctly I believe – strategy as an endless endeavor, with no final end-state. Grandiose attempts to finally solve strategic problems once and for all time, then, are doomed to fail or become irrelevant (although as Mr. Gray observes elsewhere, not necessarily within a human lifespan). Strategic ventures based on End of History-type narratives, then, won’t succeed on their own terms.
Here and elsewhere, On War can be contradictory. That’s simply reflection of the subject; there was and is no reason to expect that a few simply comprehended principles will provide a guide to proper action in the complex and chaotic enterprise of warfare. An element of luck always exists, and it cannot be properly accounted for. Ultimately, all that can be provided is a framework. Contra Jomini, there is no “algebraic formula for use on the battlefield”, at least none that will guarantee success.
Defense is the Most Fundamental Form of War
“Defense is a stronger form of war than attack.”
Book 6 Ch 3
“The concept of war does not originate with the attack, because the ultimate object of attack is not fighting: rather, it is possession. The idea of war originates with the defense, which does have fighting as its immediate object, since fighting and parrying obviously amount to the same thing. […] The side that first introduces the element of war, whose point of view brings two parties into existence, is also the side that establishes the initial laws of war. That side is the defense.”
Book 6 Ch 7
“The aggressor is always peace-loving: he would prefer to take our country unopposed.”
Book 6 Ch 5
Clausewitz builds a strong case from initial propositions that defense is fundamentally stronger than attack. I won’t completely recapitulate his arguments, but most succinctly: the defender waits, the attacker moves; the attacker must overcome more friction than the defender. Clausewitz grapples with a good deal of qualification here, but basically: by “defense” and “attack” he means “invasion” and “resistance” (Clausewitz clearly meant to go back over this; several chapters in On War regarding these definitions are obviously outlines). This does not imply the absurd conclusion that the defender always wins, but simply that other things being equal the defense is stronger. The greatest challenge to this conclusion, I think, is the 20th Century theory of strategic bombing beginning with Giulio Douhet and culminating in the nuclear missile. The actual experience of warfare in the 20th century has disproven the wilder claims of the early bomb men, and even in the nuclear age invasion obviously remains much more difficult than resistance in wars as they continue to be fought.
But is the defense not just stronger, but somehow more fundamental than the attack? Despite the excellent bon mot about the peace-loving aggressor, this sits on far less solid ground than the weaker claim of defense being simply stronger. In some respects it is only a semantic statement. However, given further reflection, I believe Clausewitz is correct, and what most convinced me are images of the current ongoing movements of the people into Europe and the United States. Consider particularly the latter, and the image below:
The laws, and the current government, of the United States claim that this is unacceptable. Yet it doesn’t matter what they claim, the migrants can simply walk into their territory and take up residence. Is this “war?” Of course not. To make this matter even clearer, consider the same body of migrants, or even an individual, instead deciding they will simply move into someone’s house. Perhaps the threat of violence is involved. Aggression, conquest? Maybe. But not a war. Now imagine instead that a national army (or “security forces”) shoot anyone crossing the frontier. What occurs now looks very much like a war. And if these people still want to cross the frontier, they must force the defenders into “political helplessness or military impotence” in order to do so – the logic of Absolute War.
The Exhaustibility of Offensive War
“Every step gained may weaken one’s superiority […] A continued advance in an offensive campaign will usually swallow up the superiority with which one began or which was gained by the victory […] The superiority one has or gains in war is only the means and not the end; it must be risked for the sake of the end.”
Book 7 Ch 22
To defend is not only stronger than to attack, but to attack involves a diminution of military power across space and time – and not necessarily a gradual one, either. I do not think this is an absolute law, but it is certainly the default for an invading army, and it applies equally to occupations as well. The increased particularity of military supply has drastically increased the cost of offense and occupation now; not only recruits but spare parts, weapons, munitions, etc. must in all but very exceptional circumstances come from an attacking army’s homeland. Living at the expense of the enemy, a basic fact of pre-industrial warfare, is now virtually unheard-of. Exceptions to this rule – allowing an aggressor to increase his power based on his progress, or to occupy foreign territory at a net gain – are special cases.
Not only a special case, but a disruptive form of strategic power. Slave revolts in Antiquity sometimes took on this characteristic. The overthrow of the Aztecs also comes to mind, as do certain revolutionary wars – Mao and his imitators relied on it to at least some degree, and he at least claimed it essential to his success. In the latter case, one might argue backwards from Clausewitz that such “snowballing” indicates that an armed force is not truly aggressing. At any rate, signs that an “aggressing” force gains power based on its progress should cause an opposing strategist to think carefully about the reasons.
This is separate from the positive psychological effects of success by an attacking force, which can produce improvements in performance if handled correctly. Such effects can counteract the effects of the material loss caused by attack or occupation but do not eliminate it.
The Political Nature of War
As I already discussed somewhat above, Clausewitz identified war as a tool of politics. I think the political nature of war has become even more apparent since the writing of On War, as various innovations have progressively removed or loosened purely physical constraints.
Aside from his descriptive pronouncements, Clausewitz does offer some prescriptions for integrating military and civil-political functions of a government; namely, placing the supreme commander in the national Cabinet. This rather thin level of formal political engagement remains popular in the West but successful armed forces elsewhere have more fully embraced the political characteristics of war. Mao, for instance, insists stridently that politicization/”indoctrination” of even individual foot soldiers is more important than even training in the execution of basic tactics, and the country he founded continues to employ political officers in its military.
People’s War
“This discussion has been less an objective analysis than a groping for the truth. The reason is that this sort of warfare is not as yet very common…”
Book 6 Ch 26
Speaking of Mao, Clausewitz has some nascent but useful thoughts on “The People in Arms”. Leaving aside the details, his thoughts on the relationship between regular and partisan forces anticipate almost all substantive subsequent theory, although as I noted previously he can’t account well for state formation. In modern terms, Clausewitz thinks partisan warfare to be a “force multiplier” and effective means of resisting invasion but ultimately unsuitable for achieving final victory. The threat posed by an armed populace should lead an invader to temper both his ends and means.
Importance of Moral Factors:
“Moral Values Cannot Be Ignored In War…Everyone rates the enemy’s bravery lower once his back is turned.”
Book 2 Ch 2
(What Clausewitz means by “moral” means more closely “psychic” or “psychological” now. “Intangible” might be another good way of putting it.)
This almost belongs to the category of trivial observations, but I decided to include it because I quite frequently encounter people, especially Western civilians, who believe that the First World War disproved or obsoleted the importance of moral factors in war. What WW proved was that certain tactics and enabling social technologies developed for pre-industrial gunpowder warfare, and often justified or spoken of in literally moral terms, were obsolete. Of course he is correct on the importance of morale.
War is the Imposition of Will by Violence
He’s not the first one to say this, but he’s right.
Characteristics of Commanders
Without rehashing the text (the meat of this matter is in Book 1, Chapter 3 of On War), successful strategists must have exceptional characteristics, although the details depend on the circumstances (“it depends” is, as usual, the beginning of wisdom). Clausewitz does correctly perceive that strategy can be mastered very quickly and intuitively – much more quickly than the technical characteristics of warfare – by someone with the suitable predisposition. Indeed, great commanders far predate any systematic study or theory of command. That being said, “everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is very difficult,” and that anyone is capable of supreme command doesn’t follow from some people being very naturally very capable.
My one complaint is Clausewitz’s beating around the bush about the benefits of ruthlessness, if not outright sociopathy, as possibly desirable characteristics of command. He correctly notes the sheer sense of responsibility that creates a crushing moral burden on any commander, and that this burden increases with the size of his command. Of course…the burden does not tell equally upon all men, as he mentions. Perhaps there are times when a man who feels such a burden lightly can more effectively pursue achieve victory and desired ends. This is of course a very sensitive subject – much of Machiavelli’s infamy arises from some relatively terse comments along these lines – but Clausewitz’s lack of a frank discussion here does blemish his otherwise very keen observations.
I have left out some trivial points – like the advantages of numerical superiority – and again warn that On War is not easily exhausted, and better analyses than mine certainly exist. The reader will notice that I draw my quotations more heavily from the earlier, better-edited portions of the book, although they are not limited to them.
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