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Go Tell the Spartans

In Defense of the Spartans

Sparta is synonymous with discipline and militarism, and has been since at least the battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC. Some people have a problem with this.  Sparta’s reputation exists and promotes certain forms of virtue; it’s also simply a description of the way the United States currently handles war.

I’m going to link several articles disparaging the Spartans, their reputation, or their admirers, and I was specifically motivated to write this in response to Myke Cole’s article in The New Republic.  However, this isn’t just about these links, but also what I’ve observed in reactions and comments to these writings, often from people I respect, and some private and/or offline discussions and conversations I’ve had in the past few years.

The Spartan Mythos

In brief, the Spartan mythos: warfare is the most important of human endeavors, and excellence in warfare is thus the highest form of human excellence.  The foundation of excellence in warfare is discipline and training.  War and the preparation for war being the most important individual or collective effort, they should be emphasized and prioritized at the expense of all other fields – commercial, artistic, philosophical, romantic, religious, etc.  Sparta is the exemplar of all these things.  I would add that even in the meanest conceptions this mythos is readily scaled – it can apply and be applied anywhere from the individual to the national level.

There are some other important secondary attributes of this mythos.  In short these are elitism, austerity, and the primacy of human over other factors in performance.  The Spartan mythos is also highly masculine, historically sometimes to the point of homoeroticism.

Modern complaints about this mythos amount to three things: that it’s factually incorrect, that it’s immoral, or that it inspires bad people.

The Myth as History

The focused study of anything will reveal previously unknown knowledge to the student.  This sounds obvious, but if the student subscribes – even implicitly – to critical theory, then even trivial revelations on hoary topics like Athens & Sparta can produce a sensation of toppling temples of narrative oppression.  My eighth grade teacher LIED!  In reality this is little more than a variation on the strawman.  Yes, there is more to the history and legend of Sparta than what’s in the head of a bro who just watched 300.  No, this doesn’t mean that you’ve “deconstructed” said history.

Just as a particularly egregious example, take this article.  The most charitable explanation for what’s written at that link is that the author – probably angry about seeing someone he didn’t like sporting a molon labe and/or 300 helmet symbol (this is a common irritant) – typed “Sparta” into Wikipedia, and combined it with some unexamined conceptions about Ancient Greece.  For instance, we learn that “The Spartans were Morons” because they used terrain to their advantage and, besides, “they lost”.  The battle, that is, not the war.

I know this might seem like cherrypicking a bad example, but the link above is only meant to illustrate the tendency of certain acquaintances to “well acktually” about various details whenever Spartan Ideals are brought up.

The facts are this: the Spartans had a distinctive constitution distinguished as much from other Greek states by communalism as by militarism dating back to some indeterminate period after the Greek Dark Ages.   By the time of the fifth century BC, Sparta was clearly one of the major, successful poleis.  The Spartans cemented a reputation for military prowess at Thermopylae in 480 BC, and continually proved their predominance until they were decisively defeated by the Thebans at Leuctra in 371 BC.  Yes, they had a hard time of it during the Peloponnesian War and some Spartans surrendered at Sphacteria, just as a far larger body of US Marines surrendered on Corregidor.  Sure, Thermopylae was a loss and the numbers involved were somewhat exaggerated for propaganda purposes.  But it was indeed a very heroic act of uncommon valor, had a significant if not decisive effect on the invading Medes, and inaugurated several generations of Spartan success.

So, a hundred-year run of markedly superior performance if not outright supremacy in war.  And that, without the benefit of any real edge in either armament or numbers.  Sparta instead relied on a “Spartiate” warrior class who trained a little harder than their competitors by driving their slaves a little harder to pick up the slack.  At the same time, this period happened to coincide with the Athenian Golden Age, supplying the historical record with several immortal philosophers and historians praising not merely the combat record of Sparta but also its national character, and by which we receive most of the details of the Spartan mythos: discipline, quasi-ascetic restraint, laconic wisdom.  While war and training for war enjoyed primacy in Spartan society, it did not come at the total exclusion of other functions: the Spartans held festivals, composed and recited poetry, constructed public buildings and monuments, etc.  The Spartans were rather insular and secretive compared to other Greek states and Athens in particular – “xenophobic” might be an appropriate modern term — something that subsequently got rolled into a general perception of “elitism”.  Nevertheless they were not a hermit kingdom, and conducted foreign relations in a more or less typical manner.

While it’s quite true that Sparta’s time in the sun didn’t last forever, it did in fact take place.  Yes, Sparta declined and eventually became a tourist attraction before fading into more or less complete irrelevance.  So have other great states, and on the subject of longevity I very rarely hear the same mouths mock the Spartan failure to maintain a three-thousand-year polity praise the millennial longevity of the Roman church.  There is certainly a degree of historical contingency as to why Sparta rather than, say, Thebes, or Switzerland, or Qin China epitomizes the militarized state in the Western mind.   But it is not a bad example of such a state; there is real history behind the legend.

The Moral Status of the Spartan Mythos

A more intelligent objection to the Spartan is that while it has a real basis in historical fact, it is morally wrong or just plain contradicts other values like republican democracy.  King Alfred may have been a great guy but that’s not how we roll.

I think it’s important to draw a distinction between Sparta as an object of national mythology or even emulation, and of individual inspiration.

Myke Cole’s article cites several historical examples (Machiavelli, John Adams, the Kibbutzniks, the Nazis, Brexiteers) of people or groups who aspired to some variant of the Spartan mythos.  I’d like to point out that none of these examples – even including the later, racist people who are Cole’s ultimate subject – wholesale adopted the constitution and social organization of a fifth-century BC Greek polis, what the kids today refer to as “LARPing”.  Indeed the very diversity of Cole’s examples shows that details matter and in reality even those who buy pretty heavily into Spartan mythology as an organizational principle can and do pick and choose what aspects of the mythos to incorporate without much danger of accidentally adopting Lycurgus the Lawgiver’s views on slavery.  This is something that I’m sure Cole has little trouble seeing when looking at e.g. ISIS vs the Islamic Republic of Egypt.

There’s also the fact that “Spartan” works just as well as an individual ideal as a national or organizational mindset.  It’s perfectly common for anyone who pursues excellence in some specific field to do so without any expectation that his goals have some universal applicability, and if this causes the practitioner to come across as or even actually be somewhat elitist in outlook this is not some great moral crime.  There is a very real and recent history of tremendous evil committed in the name of workers’ rights, but this isn’t automatically grounds to discredit OSHA, or the SEIU.

Besides, the Legend of Sparta isn’t even some key ingredient in actual militarized states!  North Korea, particularly under Kim Jong Il’s “military first” program, is at least a candidate for the closest extant analogue to the literal Spartan polis, and yet while I’m sure that some of their founders and leadership have at least heard of Sparta, Classical Greece Laconic or otherwise has no real historical influence on Korea.

(The other strong candidates for a modern Sparta are Switzerland and Israel.  Notice that all three are substantially different.)

Even other states that have to some degree deliberately adopted Spartan mythology have done so only partially, and the relationship is typically one of convenience rather than causation, the way interventionists prefer the philosophy of Wilson to Washington.  Neither Frederick II nor Jefferson Davis would have acted any differently had Sparta never existed.

This is particularly relevant to Myke Cole’s article – which is after all entitled “The Sparta Fetish is a Cultural Cancer”.   Cole notes, as I have, that a large and diverse array of people and peoples have expressed some admiration of the semi-mythical Spartan ideal, repeatedly and often with considerable fervor, since the establishment of the Spartan constitution sometime around 900 BC.  While this includes such benign entities as Medici Florence, it also includes people whom Cole doesn’t like (Trump supporters), and people whom nobody likes (Hitler).  Well, so what?  The very ubiquity of Sparta’s appeal across time, space, and ideology suggests that Cole’s “concern” about the appropriation of Spartan imagery by his political opponents means very little.

The Spartan Ideal as Descriptive

I think there is something else going on here too.  The Angry Staff Officer gets at it in this post.  “Stop Calling Us Warriors”, he pleads, singling out the Spartans among a few others.  I agree, but there’s a problem, which you might have noticed in the section above.  The Spartan mythos isn’t merely aspirational.  It can also be descriptive.  And the  description is basically accurate in an important way.

The United States is openly engaged in combat in 14 different countries as of January 2019, not to mention dozens of other “training and assistance” missions in which combat is at least a prospect.  Virtually all of this is conducted by special operations forces, who employ only the most rigorously selected and intensely trained troops in actual combat while maintaining a comparatively high ratio of support personnel and “enablers”.  If SOCOM thinks of itself as “Spartan”, as both Cole and Angry Staff Officer rightly point out they quite often do, then where’s the lie?  They are what they are, a feted warrior elite, and when they reach into the big bag of signifiers describing what they do all day, that helmet is going to be in there somewhere near the top.

This also, by the way, applies to law enforcement, which is afforded all sorts of privileges over the citizenry which bear more than a passing resemblance to those exercised by the Spartiate over the helot even as the origins of “law enforcement officers” as militia officers becomes ever less relevant.

The role of Spartan imagery in the above is completely irrelevant to any objections about the professionalization of military and law enforcement.

In conclusion, the legend of Sparta’s military prowess has a real historical basis, the legend itself has a long and varied history, and is a legitimate if rather amoral source of inspiration for both movements and individuals.

Future Tank Capabilities

In the previous post, I took at look at whether tanks will continue to exist for the foreseeable future (yes) despite improvements in weaponry.  In this post I’ll take a look at what sort of capabilities I think such a vehicle will have — onboard UAS, defilade engagement munitions, and closing the standoff gap with ATGMs.  I’m not sure whether active protection systems will eliminate the need for heavy armor, but I lean towards “no”.  These increased capabilities will make four-man crews ideal even with an autoloaded main gun.

Note on Autonomy

The ability to operate in a degraded or contested EW/low-altitude air environment will probably be a defining characteristic of a future tank, because in a completely permissive environment it will always be safer and more cost effective to fire a networked standoff munition.  So while a future tank will be integrated into battlefield networks just as they are today, it should never rely on this to kill the enemy or deny terrain.  In this way it is the inverse of an artillery piece which attacks from standoff under direction from a third party but has a non-central direct fire capability.

In a completely permissive environment, a battle tank will also be a less cost-effective sensor than something stripped of a tank’s protection and firepower.

Protection

The biggest question about protection of the future tank is whether it should dump its ultra-heavy armor.  This could happen because new munitions make armor useless, because of the availability of more effective alternatives to heavy armor, or some combination.

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M1A2C / SEPv3.  Visible: Standard side-skirt ERA, more turret front armor, Trophy APS.

I assume that APS is the replacement for heavy armor.  Even if some breakthrough in materials science occurs that allows a drastic increase in the protection:weight ratio of armor, which I don’t think likely, there is the perennial problem of lightweight equipment: when the weight of something decreases, you usually just carry more of it.

Reliable APS being a relatively new technology, no one appears ready to strip the armor off their tanks in favor of it.  Even an ideal APS will require much more attention from the crew than armor does now and will sometimes not be working.  Will future commanders allow their tanks to go into battle with an inoperable APS?  If tank armor continues to provide the level of protection against likely threats that it does today (pretty good), then probably yes.  If a vehicle is in little better shape than a jeep without its APS system, then probably not.

If antiarmor munitions continue to improve and proliferate, this decision could eventually become pointless, but I don’t think that we will get there.  The HEAT warhead has probably reached its maximum penetration-to-size ratio, so further improvements will probably be in guidance and, eventually, counter-countermeasures.  Regarding the latter, as APS systems improve, more of a munition’s payload will be dedicated to counteracting active defenses, which could actually make armor more effective in combination with active defense.  The current situation of a protection spectrum with battle tanks at the top will then continue.

Another consideration for protection is the increasing importance of urban warfare.  Urban environments and restrictive terrain in general counterintuitively favor a very heavily armored tank because the canalization and restricted fields of fire inherent to such environments imply that a tank will ceteris paribus be less able to survive through maneuver or standoff firepower.  Antiarmor attacks there will occur at shorter ranges (including “zero-range” emplaced explosives, and implying a greater angular range) and will be harder to simply avoid.  Because urban warfare will only become more common in the future, there will still be a use for heavily armored tanks, and nations that prefer a more-or-less one-size-fits-all approach to tanks will continue to use heavily armored tanks.

My guess would be that a lightly-armored, APS-protected tank could be useful for a mechanized force oriented towards maneuver warfare, but less so for urban combat for the reasons stated above — anyone who decided to build an APS-protected medium tank would still probably keep a few of their older, heavily armored vehicles as infantry-supporting urban combat specialists.

Another aspect of protection that I want to mention is CBRN defense.  Armored vehicles with CBRN overpressure systems are just better (can operate for longer with fewer casualties) in a contaminated environment than light infantry wearing protective suits.  Also, ultradense tank armor provides excellent protection against radiation.

Armament

The tank’s basic suite of weapons: a cannon, a coaxial machine gun, and a heavy machine gun — won’t see a serious change.  The only major disruption I can see is the installation of an autocannon basically designed to saturate or otherwise disable an enemy’s APS system (a heavy machine gun doesn’t have the range and might not have the power for this).  I don’t think this will happen — more likely a single antiarmor round will carry counter-countermeasures with the goal of maintaining one hit/one kill  — but I think it is possible.

A larger gun is unlikely because of the resulting decrease in ammunition load.  The decreasing ammo load of tanks with increasing gun size has not been too serious a problem because it has been accompanied by greater accuracy and greater lethality — an Abrams may only carry half as many rounds as a Sherman, but more of those rounds hit their target and more of those targets are destroyed.  A 140mm or larger gun will only be adopted if new protection schemes prove insurmountable by advanced 120mm ammunition, which I doubt.  For instance, while installation of an ammunition data link on the M1A2C is nominally to allow use of a programmable airburst round, it could also work with a selectable top-attack munition, maybe based on the canceled XM943 STAFF.

The future tank will be able to match the range of, at least, any ground-launched line-of-sight ATGM.  Entire battalions are wiped out at NTC at standoff by tank destroyers armed with simulated Konkurs and Kornet missiles, and the performance has been repeated several times in combat albeit not against Americans.

48BD1B4600000578-5332247-image-a-42_1517403165742[1]This can happen to you.

This is obviously absurd, unacceptable, and unnecessary.  Extended-range guided shells will be available for every tank in the future.  For 120mm guns, the LAHAT/Nimrod is already available, although it’s probably worth developing a high pressure/high velocity missile.

In addition to increased range, the future tank will have some non line-of-sight (NLOS) or “anti-defilade” capability.  The guided munition mentioned above will have the capability to be directed onto a target by a third platform.  This could be a separately deployed sensor but in keeping with the importance of autonomy mentioned above will include an onboard small UAS with a short-range, high-bandwidth data link.

While the UAS’s video output will need to be visible to the vehicle commander, its actual operation will be the responsibility of the fourth crew member (“loader”).  Task load on the other three members of the crew is already too high.  Three-man crews will be only be found on limited-purpose support vehicles like the Stryker MGS.  Yes, this means that Eastern tanks with three-man crews are headed down the wrong path.  Most likely, operators of T-72s and derivative designs will make ineffective attempts to reduce crew load by automation or introduce a second platform, increasing vulnerability to EM disruption.

Other Considerations

All of these new capabilities will require yet more electrical power.  This is a well-known fact, just about every upgrade to every armored vehicle currently in service includes increases in onboard electrical generation, but I wanted to point it out anyway.

Aside from the integrated small UAS mentioned above, non-targeting “situational awareness” cameras will be common with the goal of making the vehicle “transparent” as with the F-35’s helmet display, and minimizing the need to fight with hatches open.  My experience with experimental cameras of this sort makes me doubt this goal will ever be completely realized — mud and other terrain hazards will frequently obscure the sensors, which will probably have rather small apertures.  Still, it will continue the long trend of improved awareness inside armored vehicles.

Electronic warfare equipment will become more common if not standard, although this may be considered an extension of a vehicle’s active protection system.  Disrupting an adversary’s tactical datalinks in order to avoid succumbing to the logic of “sensors and dispensers” will become so important that even the most trivial employment of combat power won’t be done without it.  And based on the logic of autonomy as a defining characteristic of a future tank, they will probably need an onboard EW suite including  a more powerful jammer than the very short range counter-IED systems that have been deployed in recent wars, rather than completely relying on separate platforms.  Tankers already need to reacquaint themselves with passive measures like EM signature reduction anyway, so management of a 3kW jammer wouldn’t be out of the question.  I don’t think that a tank chassis will be used as a dedicated EW platform since such a vehicle wouldn’t need the same level of protection as a tank.

Crew training standards will increase, and may approach those of flight crew although I don’t think they will ever actually reach that level — flight is inherently less fault tolerant than ground movement.  Standardized schools and qualifications not just for initial entry but for each crew position might become a reality.  Unit leaders now can get ahead of the curve by instituting stricter crew qualification standards on their own initiative.

Do Tanks Have a Future?

tl;dr: yes

What is a Tank, Anyway?

In three words: Mobile Protected Firepower.  Implicitly, it is also ground-based.  This discussion will involve three other somewhat related but important qualities — autonomy, responsiveness, and availability — which will be covered in more detail later.  However, Mobile Protected Firepower is the fundamental nature of the tank.

A tank is mobile because it moves faster than a man on foot; also, practically, it moves faster over certain terrain types than motor transport vehicles.  It is protected likewise because it requires more firepower to kill than a man on foot.  And it itself has more firepower than a man on foot.  The comparison to the infantryman is not only for historical reasons but because he is the fundamental component of warfare.

Clausewitz and Jomini

Now that I’ve read Clausewitz and Jomini, I suppose it’s only fair to compare them.  I think it boils down to this: Clausewitz attempted to gain timeless, fundamental insights with some success. Jomini thought in more practical, concrete terms.  This (along with Clausewitz’s early death) probably accounts for the popularity of Jomini’s views in the 19th century, and Clausewitz’s 20th century resurgence.

Notes on Jomini

Having read Clausewitz, the natural thing to do is to read Antoine-Henri Jomini.  So what does he say?

200px-Gleyre_Antoine_Henri_Jomini[1]

I read the 1862 translation of The Art of War (1838), which includes some later-written appendices and afterthoughts.

On the whole, Jomini concerns himself with the practical side of military operations, even delving down to the lowest tactical level.  He considers politics (and morality) only loosely connected to the question with which he concerns himself: how best to move, sustain, and employ military forces most effectively.  Despite his reputation as a highly prescriptive theorist, he is too wise to claim that following his dicta will guarantee victory even in favorable circumstances, although he writes in a very forthright and confident manner when expressing his ideas.

Jomini has two basic principles: identify and concentrate on a “decisive point”, and ensure that one’s line of communications be kept open to the “base” from which the army issues.  His major corollary: the use of interior lines allows an army to outperform its opponent in accomplishing these tasks.

Turning a City into a Fortress

I started writing this in January and sort of got stuck on it, along with some other things going on.  I’m writing here to sort my thoughts out about something, so it may not be the most coherent.

City-fortresses don’t really exist anymore.  If they did, what might they look like?  Why would anyone want one?

Bottom Line

Fortifying the city as-is will require billions of dollars, a reserve system, and would probably create a tradeoff between mass resettlement and maintaining accustomed levels of economic activity.  Two historically novel problems are the volume of traffic required for commerce and the threat of stand-off attack.  The fortress would have no strategic depth to mitigate the effects of air and missile attacks, which are much easier to carry out on the margin than even in the mid-20th century.

Picking Up a Dropped Ball

 

 

On October 22 this year, an Afghan soldier shot three Czech troops in a “green-on-blue incident”, killing one.  Afghan security forces captured the shooter and handed him over to the Czechs, who beat him to death.  This was an understandable and in fact morally acceptable alternative to turning the prisoner over to a legal system that has lost the trust of those it ostensibly serves through its inability to deliver justice.

What would have happened had the Czechs turned the man, Wahidullah Khan, over alive to the proper authorities?  He would have been interrogated; the interrogation would determine whether Khan acted on behalf of others or — often happens — for personal reasons.  The problem is what happens next.

“The Right Stuff”, and the Nigerien Ambush

Last week, the commanding general of SOCOM Africa was reprimanded over an October 2017 skirmish/ambush in Niger that left four special forces soldiers dead.  In all likelihood the actual issue is that the incident brought unwanted attention on the American presence in Niger.  Nevertheless, Army’s attitude toward this incident reminds me of Tom Wolfe’s The Right Stuff:

Barely a week had gone by before another member of the Group was coming in for a landing in the same type of aircraft, the A3J, making a ninety-degree turn to his final approach, and something went wrong with the controls, and he ended up with one rear stabilizer wing up and the other one down, and his ship rolled in like a corkscrew from 800 feet up and crashed…after dinner one night they mentioned that the departed had been a good man but was inexperienced, and when the malfunction in the controls put him in that bad corner, he didn’t know how to get out of it.
[…]
Not long after that, another good friend of theirs went up in an F-4, the Navy’s newest and hottest fighter plane, known as the Phantom. He reached twenty thousand feet and then nosed over and dove straight into Chesapeake Bay. It turned out that a hose connection was missing in his oxygen system and he had suffered hypoxia and passed out at the high altitude…How could anybody fail to check his hose connections? And how could anybody be in such poor condition as to pass out that quickly from hypoxia?
[…]
When Bud Jennings crashed and burned in the swamps at Jacksonville, the other pilots in Pete Conrad’s squadron said: How could he have been so stupid? It turned out that  Jennings had gone up in the SNJ with his cockpit canopy opened in a way that was expressly forbidden in the manual, and carbon monoxide had been sucked in from the exhaust, and he passed out and crashed. All agreed that Bud Jennings was a good guy and a good pilot, but his epitaph on the ziggurat was: How could he have been so stupid? This seemed shocking at first, but by the time Conrad had reached the end of that bad string at Pax River, he was capable of his own corollary to the theorem: viz., no single factor ever killed a pilot; there was always a chain of mistakes. But what about Ted Whelan, who fell like a rock from 8,100 feet when his parachute failed? Well, the parachute was merely part of the chain: first, someone should have caught the structural defect that resulted in the hydraulic leak that triggered the emergency; second, Whelan did not check out his seat-parachute rig, and the drogue failed to separate the main parachute from the seat; but even after those two mistakes, Whelan had fifteen or twenty seconds, as he fell, to disengage himself from the seat and open the parachute manually. Why just stare at the scenery coming up to smack you in the face! And everyone nodded. (He failed—but I wouldn’t have!)
–Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff
Feel free to read the whole thing, it’s worth it.  Anyway, contemporary “flight test”, and later NASA, were organizations with no tolerance for human error.  If cultivating such an attitude required occasionally blaming someone for something that was not, objectively speaking, their fault, well the payoff in effort and vigilance were worth it.  Better to reprimand one innocent man than let two others make avoidable mistakes.

Believe

Senate Armed Services Committee, 2031

Sen. Cynthia Lederhaut: Admiral, this is the third woman to come forward with similar allegations.  There seems to have been a pattern.

Adm. William B. Norden, Pacific Command: Senator, I flatly deny these allegations.  I’m a married man.  I’ve been a married man for my entire service career.  I’ve never met any of these women. I’ve —

Sen. Lederhaut: But you were in Laem Chabang on the date Ms. Ginting alleges that you attacked her?

Adm. Norden: I have been there, ma’am,.  I’ve been in dozens of ports.  I’m a man of the sea.  I couldn’t tell you the exact date off the top of my head.

Sen. Lederhaut: But you do remember you never went into the Paupau Sports Bar?

Adm. Norden: I don’t recall, ma’am, no.  It’s standard for ships’ officers to conduct a walk-through of bars where the sailors might be going.  I’ve been in hundreds of these establishments.  But I certainly never assaulted anyone.

Sen. Lederhaut: And no one ever assaulted a local woman?  This seems to have been a problem.  Maybe still is a problem.

Adm Norden: Well, occasionally we do have sailors commit crimes while ashore, unfortunately — they also commit them at sea and at home, I would add.  But they are punished to the full extent of military law.

Sen. Lederhaut: Back to the subject: how do you account for Ms. Ginting’s accusations?  And Ms. Ocampo?  Ms. Reyes?  Maybe there was a misunderstanding?  Maybe they mistook you for someone else?

Adm. Norden: I suppose they might be mistaken, Senator.  I suppose they might also be lying.

Sen. Lederhaut: Did they all get together and make this up?  Is it a conspiracy?

Adm. Norden: When the impossible has been eliminated, whatever remains — however implausible — is the truth.

Sen. Lederhaut: And these allegations are impossible?

How Effective Were Civil War Rifles?

The armies of the American Civil War fought (mostly) with muzzle-loading rifles.  The expanding Minie ball allowed muzzle-loaded rifles to fire at the same rate as smoothbore muskets.  Rifled muskets had existed for hundreds of years previously, but rifling required a tight seal between bullet and bore to work and so loading a rifle meant hammering the bullets down inside instead of just dropping it.  The Minie ball fell freely down a rifle barrel, then expanded against barrel grooves when fired.

This made bullets more accurate.  How much did this contribute to the bloodshed?  In Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Paddy Griffith proposes that it made little difference.  Griffith’s overall thesis is that the Civil War was the last of the Napoleonic wars, not the first of the modern wars.  Regarding the alleged impact of rifled muskets, he basically makes the following claims:

1. Increased length of battles, not improved weapon effects, drove casualty rates.  Civil War soldiers didn’t die in such large numbers because rifle fire was more lethal, but because because they fought longer.

2. Documentary evidence, while sketchy, suggests that the actual engagement range of Civil War rifle infantry units was no higher than of Napoleonic smoothbore infantry, and this fire was no more effective (see above).

3. Whatever the theoretical capability of Civil War rifles, soldiers lacked either the training or experience necessary to exploit it.

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Chart from Griffith’s book comparing the Civil War to the unquestionably “modern” WWI and Napoleon’s campaigns.

These assertions might be true.  The rifled musket didn’t need to significantly improve the killing power of infantry fire to have a tactical effect.  I believe that above any improvement in killing power, rifles enabled Civil War units to deliver suppressing fire effectively in a manner that was not possible with smoothbore muskets.

Griffith’s Assertions Are Not Ridiculous

1903-springfield-rifle-F[1]

I have this rifle, an M1903, sighted at 100 yards.  I fire at a target 400 yards away.  Based on intuition, how far does the bullet fall below my sight?

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