Now that I’ve read Clausewitz and Jomini, I suppose it’s only fair to compare them. I think it boils down to this: Clausewitz attempted to gain timeless, fundamental insights with some success. Jomini thought in more practical, concrete terms. This (along with Clausewitz’s early death) probably accounts for the popularity of Jomini’s views in the 19th century, and Clausewitz’s 20th century resurgence.
Where They Agree
Aside from trivialities like “numerical superiority is better, ceteris paribus”, Clausewitz and Jomini agree on several concepts.
The first, which I want to get out of the way, is that they both think that Dietrich von Bulow is an idiot. In fact I think it likely that the impetus for both thinkers was at least partly that they figured they could do a better job of military theory than von Bulow. I haven’t read von Bulow’s work myself, and don’t intend to do so; I’ll take their word for it.
Both writers thought deeply about the challenges of crossing and fighting in mountains — this was perhaps the “urban warfare” of the day. They came to pretty much the same conclusions: mountain passes favored the defender and open-order fighting, but given sufficient manpower any pass could be forced — the defensive advantage of mountainous terrain was no absolute, and could tempt the defender into overextension. Jomini distinguished between mountain crossing and fighting in “mountainous provinces”, opining that the latter was a much more difficult matter.
Thinking about the defense of mountain ranges and rivers led both writers to similar conclusions about the ineffectiveness of “cordon warfare”, or trying to defend a long continuous frontier or linear obstacle. This inevitably results in the breach and penetration of the cordon by a more concentrated force; meanwhile, the defender has trouble responding to this penetration because his forces are dispersed and usually must act on exterior lines to respond to the invader.
They agree about the importance of interior lines, although with slightly different reasoning. For Clausewitz, interior lines are an indicator of the natural advantage of the defense. For Jomini, they are a matter of geometry which can accrue to either the attack or the defense. While Jomini gives a better account of why interior lines are an advantage (although frankly it is fairly intuitive), overall I prefer Clausewitz’s connection of the concept to a more fundamental characteristic, defense. In fact, this distinction serves as a pretty good example of the differences between the two men.
Not surprisingly given that mass mobilization was the disruptive military technology of the day, both writers thought about the “nation in arms”, “People’s War”, and irregular warfare. And they came to similar conclusions, namely that these were difficult wars to fight but that irregular forces needed to have some regular backing in order to be effective. Jomini went further and recommended supplying such complementary military power to insurgencies against one’s enemies.
Disagreements
Jomini believed that effective intelligence was of vital importance to an army, but either couldn’t or didn’t provide much detail beyond recommending a variety of collection assets, including informants. Clausewitz, in keeping with a broader tendency to assume a sort of deterministic interchangeability of contemporary military forces, was dismissive of it. Clausewitz is simply wrong about this, and I believe the difference in opinion between the two men results from their personal experience; Jomini had much more access to the inner circles of commanding generals and military establishments than did his rival. Clausewitz likewise, and wrongly, downplayed the importance of military deception. He believed it to be generally a waste of time. Jomini did not. This is directly related to their views on the importance of intelligence (deception frustrates the enemy’s intelligence efforts), and again Jomini is correct.
Clausewitz famously believed in the importance of the Decisive Battle, calling other forms of military action “small change”. Jomini took the consequentialist position that whatever achieves your objectives most efficiently is best, and that if a commander can accomplish this without a set piece battle, then all well and good. (Clausewitz would have countered this, I think, by saying that the quality of victory obtained by battle is better in various ways that that achieved by maneuver, siege, or threat.) I think Jomini is again correct here, although Clausewitz does a better job of explaining the nature and origins of strategic objectives starting with his “War is the continuation of policy by other means” maxim.
Clausewitz was convinced of the basic equality of character between armies and nations. The somewhat reactionary Jomini believed that national armies reflected a nation’s essential character (i.e. the French were more excitable than the Prussians), and that this is reflected in substantial differences in the composition and doctrine of different armies. Jomini specifically admires the exploits of the Cossacks in Russian service — having seen them from both ends by the time he wrote The Art of War — and uses them several times as an example of fighting forces with distinct if not unique characteristics. I tend to agree more with Jomini’s view of things, and would add that however things stood in the 19th century, modern armies do have serious differences in equipment, training, doctrine, etc. One needn’t agree with Jomini’s essentialism to see that he’s correct about this.
The Attack and the Defense
Jomini considered the attack stronger than the defense. Clausewitz believed that the defense was no only stronger, but that this was true on a fundamental level and further that defense (resistance to invasion) was the most basic form of war.
Clausewitz is right, and he’s right for the right reasons as well: an attacker experiences more friction than a defender. On very close examination, I think the two writers are not totally at odds, because Jomini’s emphasis of an attack is based on “all things being equal”, but they are not. Obviously attacks and offensives sometimes succeed — neither author denies this obvious conclusion.
I suspect Clausewitz has only become more correct as weapons have become more lethal, which allow errors caused by friction to have more severe consequences.
Clausewitz’s idea that offensive military power is a consumable resource, which comes from this line of thinking, is also I think his most underrated insight.
The Center of Gravity vs The Decisive Point
Jomini and Clausewitz both recognize that the fundamental principle of waging war is to determine where force can be most effectively applied, and apply it. Jomini calls this location where maximum effect can be achieved the “decisive point”, and Clausewitz calls it the “center of gravity”.
Jomini never quite gives an exact definition of a “decisive point”, but he still makes it pretty clear what he’s talking about. For instance, in Article XIX, he says that
[T]he name of decisive strategic point should be given to all those [points] which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise.
By the way, compare this with the definition of a “decisive point” in ADRP 1-02 (Terms and Military Symbols), published in 2016:
A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success
Jomini also says that the “fundamental principle of war” is the following:
- To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one’s own
- To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces.
- On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.
- To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy.
Implicitly, the decisive point is where the mass of an army will have the greatest effect. Jomini goes on to say later that the decisive point may be either geographical or based on the enemy’s disposition i.e. either terrain or enemy focused. Decisive points are not fixed in time or space: what is a decisive point now may not be so tomorrow, or in an hour.
Clausewitz on the other hand defines the “center of gravity” and gives some examples:
“The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed…[i]n small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion…Blow after blow must be aimed in the same direction…Not by taking things the easy way – using superior strength to filch some province…by constantly seeking out the center of his power, by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy.”
In keeping with my general impression of the two men, Jomini’s Decisive Point is a more immediately useful concept than Clausewitz’s center of gravity, for two reasons. The first is that Jomini acknowledges that there may be multiple decisive points, and the second is that Jomini believes that a commander can “act upon” a decisive point by means other than through set-piece warfare.
Despite these problems, the “center of gravity” remains a popular concept. Because of these problems, it has taken on different meanings. ADRP 1-02, an Army publication, defines “center of gravity” as
The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.
and JP 5-0 (Joint Planning) on the other hand defines the “center of gravity” as
A source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.
Emphases are both mine.
The USMC also considers the center of gravity to be plural, stating in MCDP 1 that
It will often be necessary to attack several lesser centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities simultaneously or in sequence to have the desired effect.
“Critical vulnerability” is the terminology by which modern center of gravity analysts conceive of indirect actions against a center of gravity.
JP 5-0 also includes this graphic:
(Please take a moment to admire the geometric perfection of the diagram. The way in which the arrows form a flawless circle…this is truly the work of a professional.)
The graphic, and the definitions above, certainly imply a good deal of overlap between the two concepts.
What has really happened, I think, is that the “center of gravity” has become a higher-level (strategic/operational) concept, and the “decisive point” has become a lower level (operational/tactical) one. Even though Clausewitz’s thinking on the center of gravity is flawed — there isn’t necessarily one specific thing holding a force together, nor should matching strength with strength be prescribed as a general formula for success — he was grasping at a more fundamental truth than Jomini. Jomini, I think, conceived of decisive points in terms of one’s own objectives. Clausewitz thought of centers of gravity in terms of effects on the enemy, and more specifically as a way to “unravel” an adversary at the most basic level and defeat him totally. As total war became a more salient concept in the 20th century, it is no surprise that a theory of total victory became more common.
Regardless of my thoughts on the matter, the Decisive Point is clearly a more concrete, physical concept than the Center of Gravity.
Other Areas of Emphasis
Some important topics were simply covered in more detail, or at all, by only one author.
Jomini, for instance, accounts for the effects of sea power whereas Clausewitz explicitly excludes this. Jomini is not a “sea power theorist” — he thinks of navies exclusively in terms of their ability to transport armies from one place to another, and keep them supplied — but he at least concerns himself with how a maritime power can use its naval forces to its advantage in continental warfare, the British being very much the exemplars.
Clearly based on his service as a rear area commander with the Grand Army, Jomini places great importance on military logistics and describes them in some detail; Clausewitz mostly ignores them, and when he doesn’t, he clearly doesn’t know what he’s talking about, as when he wrote that troops being surprised in cantonment wasn’t really a big deal. As I wrote in my initial impressions of Jomini, I think he overstated the importance of lines of communication in the 19th century but has since been more correct. Probably LOCs were particularly important to Napoleon’s Russia campaign beyond the contemporary norm, due to the size of the undertaking and the relative impoverishment of Russian territory.
Likewise, Clausewitz thinks more deeply about the political nature of war. Jomini acknowledges it, but considers it a separate but connected sphere of activity. Clausewitz’s conception of war as a dialectical process between escalation and restraining forces has no parallel in Jomini’s writing.
Conclusion
Jomini thinks in more concrete, practical terms than does Clausewitz. The Art of War is a much better field manual for a 19th-century army than On War. Unfortunately, this also means that The Art of War contains considerable amounts of material not really relevant outside of its contemporary environment. Clausewitz is more of a philosopher and writes to distill warfare to its most fundamental concepts, often getting important concepts wrong — though when he’s wrong, he’s wrong in interesting ways.
Leave a Reply