I originally heard Rick Atkinson’s “Crusade” mentioned in a discussion about French & British forces underperforming during Desert Storm . I put it on my to-read list, found a copy in a used bookstore, and read it. Atkinson doesn’t actually have that much to say about the British or the French. “Crusade” is a solid chronicle of the war, and even though it’s not in the same league as Atkinson’s best work, he did produce it rather quickly (published 1993), especially given the detail of both the sources and the writing. The title derives from Atkinson’s thesis — that President George H.W. Bush drummed up support for the war by turning it into something that it wasn’t, a great Crusade — but he thankfully doesn’t spend much time on this.
Focus on Air & Sea Power
Crusade opens with a scene aboard the battleship U.S.S. Wisconsin, where the crew struggles to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles from their antique warship. In this and later scenes during the initial air campaign, Atkinson admirably captures the frustration, uncertainty, and fear experienced before the virtual Coalition impunity became evident.
Some very frank interviews with strike pilots give a good reminder of what the flyboys are up against. One F-117 pilot described cowering with his head down in the cockpit at the sheer volume of anti-aircraft fire on his first mission, alone in the air under radio silence and hoping his plane was as invisible as advertised.
Most of the book’s 608 pages are devoted to the air campaign. And why shouldn’t they be? The great ground campaign which so dominates the thinking of the land warfare services lasted all of four days, and that generously. The Battle of 73 Easting, which is certainly the most-discussed tank battle of any recent vintage, receives about two paragraphs of treatment. In this and other ways, Atkinson admirably keeps the entire war in perspective throughout the book.
The Scud Threat & The Limitations of Irregular Warfare
In hindsight, Saddam Hussein’s use of Scud missiles was clearly an attempt to drive a wedge into the attacking coalition by provoking Israel. Atkinson gives Israeli chestbeating more credence than I did or do, although it was a real problem. He doesn’t dabble in commentary, but the nature and significance of the “Scud threat” is a nearly pure demonstration of the political nature of warfare. Even accounting for the Dhahran barracks strike, the missiles did little material damage. However, they required highly disproportionate resources — air sorties, special forces, missile defenses — to counter, and of course put American and Israeli governments in a tricky situation to the effect that the American national leadership felt it had no choice but to commit those resources over the objection of its theater commander, Schwarzkopf. The air force resources dedicated to Scud hunting, in particular, represented a substantial opportunity cost.
The Scud hunting missions required extensive use of special forces from both the US and Britain, mostly performing their reconnaissance role. Atkinson notes just how hard the snake eaters had to work against the same Iraqi Army that collapsed like a wet noodle when it met the main body of the Coalition ground forces. And, while these operations succeeded in suppressing Scud launches to acceptable levels, they required this Herculean effort to be maintained constantly in order to sustain the effect. I am reminded once again both of how ultimately permissive current operating environments like Afghanistan really are for the operations of special forces, and of the interminable, usually indecisive nature of irregular warfare. Schwarzkopf and his subordinates appear dismissive of SF direct action, viewing it as fundamentally indecisive.
Was It Too Easy?
That victory came so quickly after the ground campaign started on 24 February 1991 made the entire war look trivial. Atkinson presents pretty clear evidence, corroborated by various interviewed officers, that the Coalition grossly overestimated the enemy not only in quality but in quantity (I still often see numbers of “opposing forces” that include the entire Iraqi military, rather than just those forces south of the Euphrates that actually fought or even could have fought).
Atkinson’s writing on this matter is implicitly suffused with the zeitgeist of its 1993 publishing date, with Bush’s recent election loss and the collapse of the Soviet Union overshadowing any aftereffects of the war. Atkinson doesn’t comment much on it, but it’s pretty clear from his interviewees that they expected an “easy” victory but were surprised by the near-invulnerability of their own forces. This was helped by wise decisions — such as not launching an amphibious assault — and enemy incompetence in e.g. obstacle placement, but the officers in charge were clearly prepared to accept scores of aircraft lost and a few thousand casualties on the ground, and it just didn’t happen. This set a new normal for ground combat that was reinforced by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the effects did not become evident until later; I don’t think anyone has properly reckoned with them.
Also, despite the “triviality” of the victory, I note that the month of intense, highly destructive, and unprecedentedly accurate bombing failed to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. This required an offense by a large ground force, and if the actual shooting was trivial, the planning and positioning of that force certainly was not (Atkinson focuses more on the political rather than logistical details of the forces in theater, though he acknowledges the latter). I would have liked to have heard from a logistician or two — Crusade’s military sources are mostly pilots and operations planners.
Atkinson’s chronicle makes a strong case in favor of the decision to curtail the air campaign after the Iraqi army had been soundly defeated. Further attacks would put men and machines at some risk, and had no real chance of achieving any identifiable objective (bombing didn’t even drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait on its own).
Hot Off The Press
I suspect some of the flaws in Crusade results from its Atkinson striking while the iron was hot. Atkinson gives relatively vague details about targeting and intelligence — undoubtedly because of the classified nature of these activities. He also had no access to any Iraqi sources or perspectives on the bombing. He can hardly be blamed for this — a few details have dribbled out since Saddam’s ouster but most Iraqi army narratives I’ve seen deal with either the war with Iran or with the post-Gulf War insurrections inside Iraq.
Early on in the book, I thought Crusade‘s focus on the personalities of senior commanders, especially Schwarzkopf and Powell, somewhat excessive. However, Atkinson doesn’t make his book about them and their own and others’ characters weren’t irrelevant. President Bush himself had suspiciously little role in the book; I don’t know whether this reflected the President’s actual role in the conflict, Atkinson’s focus, or simply a lack of sources with access. I found Schwarzkopf’s near-bullying attitude towards his subordinate commanders obnoxious, but ultimately he made the right decisions.
My Own Thoughts
Whatever qualifications can be tacked on, the lopsided victory of the Gulf War did result in a sea change in expectations about the costs of war. I believe this expectation is due for a serious correction in the future, and in the meantime it has created an illusion of impunity and a conflation of the concepts of invulnerability and invincibility: it’s no longer enough for an army to win, it must do so with trivial loss of life among its own ranks. The neocon-driven aims of Iraq & Afghanistan have also set the bar for victory absurdly high, at total overthrow of the opposing state and the ideological salting of the earth in their former territories. The current state of affairs, where the only acceptable use of ground forces is to achieve World War 2 -style unconditional victories with Gulf War -style impunity, is a disaster waiting to happen.
Crusade gave also gave me a good perspective on the Gulf War outside of the ground fight. I’m sure the Air Force is as at least as awash in tales of the air campaign as the Army and Marines are in 73 Easting, Medina Ridge, and Liberation of Kuwait both formally and informally, but it’s mostly news to me.
There exist more detailed accounts about specific aspects of engagements of the war, but this is a great book with an overall view of the Desert Storm campaign. Atkinson doesn’t get the balance between strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives down as tightly as he does in his later-written World War 2 books, but he doesn’t disappoint either.
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