Now that I’ve read Clausewitz and Jomini, I suppose it’s only fair to compare them. I think it boils down to this: Clausewitz attempted to gain timeless, fundamental insights with some success. Jomini thought in more practical, concrete terms. This (along with Clausewitz’s early death) probably accounts for the popularity of Jomini’s views in the 19th century, and Clausewitz’s 20th century resurgence.
Tag: Jomini
Having read Clausewitz, the natural thing to do is to read Antoine-Henri Jomini. So what does he say?
![200px-Gleyre_Antoine_Henri_Jomini[1]](https://i0.wp.com/sfoil.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/200px-gleyre_antoine_henri_jomini1.jpg?resize=200%2C249&ssl=1)
I read the 1862 translation of The Art of War (1838), which includes some later-written appendices and afterthoughts.
On the whole, Jomini concerns himself with the practical side of military operations, even delving down to the lowest tactical level. He considers politics (and morality) only loosely connected to the question with which he concerns himself: how best to move, sustain, and employ military forces most effectively. Despite his reputation as a highly prescriptive theorist, he is too wise to claim that following his dicta will guarantee victory even in favorable circumstances, although he writes in a very forthright and confident manner when expressing his ideas.
Jomini has two basic principles: identify and concentrate on a “decisive point”, and ensure that one’s line of communications be kept open to the “base” from which the army issues. His major corollary: the use of interior lines allows an army to outperform its opponent in accomplishing these tasks.